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THE FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
REQUIRING UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION*
By WILLIAM L. MIATTHEWS, JR.**
PART I
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL ORIGINS
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
For many years the state governments in this country were
financed in the most part by a general property tax. During
the first century of their history when real estate and personal
property were appreciating in value as a result of the nation's
rapid expansion, the free development of its natural resources
and a parallel rise of industrialism, a fiscal system so based
worked reasonably well. But m the last fifty years there has
been constant agitation for tax reform which would enable the
states to reach the more productive sources of revenue that exist
in the complex and highly developed industrial economy of
modern times. The need for money in ever increasing amount to
meet the demands of modern government has caused every state
to attempt improvement in its system of taxation. Considerable
progress has been made, but the principal difficulty has been
how to cut and alter a fiscal fabric originally woven around the
general property tax to fit a new pattern of wealth measured m
terms of intangible property, income, inheritance, business priv-
ilege and sales. The legislator, who is usually expected to initiate
the change, has recognized the greatest obstruction to the new
designs periodically devised by the econonst to be constitutional
limitations on the power of the legislature in matters of taxation.
The citizen in his role as a recipient of governmental benefits has
wanted these tailors of his to become crusaders, but as a tax-
payer he has been content with their ability as craftsmen for he
is slow to adopt new fashions.
* This is the first of four articles based on a thesis written in
partial fulfillment of requirements for the S.J.D. degree at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School. The remaining installments will
appear in the next three issues of the Journal.
** A.B., Western Kentucky State College; LL.B., University of
Kentucky; LL.M., University of Michigan, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Kentucky, Lexington.
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Of the constitutional limitations involved, the nearly
universal provision that taxes must be "uniform" is the most
conspicuous.i In recent years amendments allowing classifica-
tion of property and uniformity within the class have relieved
some of the pressure, but in many states the power to tax still
is restricted by constitutional standards of uniformity This re-
quirement in all its variations is the one under which the con-
stitutionality of tax legislation has been attacked so often, it is
the one winch plagmes the legislatures when they are confronted
with drafting new tax laws to tap new sources of revenue, and
it is the one which has led the courts into a maze of confusing
and conflicting interpretations resulting in many kinds of urn-
formity and enumerable artificial categories for taxes. The
problem is similar to the direct tax apportionment controversy
which raged for so long under the Federal Constitution for in
both situations the central question has been how to permit in-
creasing freedom in the exercise of the essential power to tax,
subject to express constitutional provisions, and still maintain
the integrity of the constitution, the legislature, and the courts.
In a general way much of the confusion stems from three
factors. First, since the uniformity requirement is imbedded in
the constitutions rather than the statutes, its construction in-
volves the fundamental law of the state. In various stages of
our judicial history this law has been interpreted differently ac-
cording to the time and place as well as the political exigencies
surrounding the case. Secondly, our federal system of inde-
pendent taxing sovereigns, each with its own court of last resort,
"For a listing of constitutional provisions by states see Table I,
which appears as an appendix to this article. For a discussion of the
kinds of uniformity resulting from a difference in constitutional
phraseology see p. 54 et seq. One of the most lucid statements about
these provisions as an obstacle to tax reform is that of a committee
appointed by the National Tax Association to prepare a plan for a
model system of state and local taxation: " it is certain that no
important departures from the system of general property tax are
possible in many of the states under constitutional restrictions which
provide that taxation must be uniform, equal and proportional. That
such constitutional limitations have, in fact, tended to secure neither
uniformity or equality in taxation, also is fully set forth in the pro-
ceedings of the annual conference of the Association and in various
reports of special committees. Upon this subject the committee needs
only to say that in states which are now limited by constitutional
restrictions prescribing a uniform rule or method of taxation, no
satisfactory adjustment of tax problems can be reached until such
limitations are removed, or at least modified." 12 PRoc. NAT. TAX
Ass'N. 469 (1919).
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lends itself to a variety of explanations for the same concepts or
at least similar language. While this quantitative feature is not
peculiar to the particular problem, it has contributed materially
to the host of meanings given the words used and the ideas they
skynbolize. Thirdly, while the economic and business life of the
country has developed rapidly together with new methods of
reaching new sources of revenue through taxation, the constitu-
tional language and techniques for interpretation have remained
comparatively constant. When many of the states' constitutions
were written, or last amended, some of the modern notions of
taxation were unknown, and the very theory on which they are
based was foreign to the economic and business philosophy of
that day This lag between economic realities and judicial in-
terpretation of long-existing constitutional provisions is harder
to isolate as a true source of the confusion that exists than the
other two, but it is no less important.
The traditional approach to a solution of the problem of
when to invoke the limitation, where the wording in the con-
stitution allows for exclusion of certain types of taxes, has been
to look at the inherent nature of the tax in question to see if it
is a property tax, or a tax on a privilege, or whether its incidence
can be shifted, or if it has some other salient feature such as a
reasonable basis for exemption and classification.2 This has
been the characteristic manner of the economist, the legislator,
the jurist, and the legal writer. The method has been analytical
and deductive resulting in the categorization of taxes. The
boundaries of the categories have been established by making
traits consistently present in the nature of the tax determinative,
and from the category into which the tax is fitted the legal result
has been deduced. Without intending at this point to become
involved in a controversy of dialectics, it is thought that the con-
fusion has been increased by this limited approach. It has led
to kinds of uniformity as well as to extremely nice distinctions
concerning the nature of a tax, and has brought about a ramifica-
tion of categories and near-categories. A more serious objection
is its failure to account for all the factors conceded to be present
by passing over lightly the function and use which the provisions
'As shown in subsequent discussion, the uniformity provision
of a particular state constitution may not apply to all taxes. In such
cases the problem of interpretation is primarily one of determining
what kind of tax has been levied.
L.-J.-3
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have had as restrictions on the taxing power. Charles L. B.
Lowndes in discussing rigid conceptualism in the constitutional
law of taxation has stated the point in unusual words .3
"As long as the tradition persists that conclusions
in constitutional cases are deduced from definitely fore-
ordained constitutional premises rather than the ex-
igencies of clashing individual and public interests, the
active factors in a tax decision must remain more or less
veiled behind a sacerdotal conceptualism. It is tremend-
ously important, however, for the lawyer to pierce this
barrier; to lift the veil of premeditated hypocrisy and
come to grips with the active determinants behind the
course of decision."
In the present study an attempt will be made to understand
from this additional viewpoint of function and use the limitation
found in the state constitutions requiring taxes to be uniform.
No purely analytical definition of the limitation or the categories
into which taxes have been forced by its use is contemplated,
but rather, both will be examined functionally (a) as to their
historical origins, (b) as they have been defined and applied by
the courts to certain basic taxes, and (c) as to their present
utility
'Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions in the Constitutional Law of
Taxation, 47 HARV. L. REV. 628, 659 (1934).
CHAPTER II.
THE ORIGINS OF UNIFORMITY
SECTION 1.
UNIFOR31ITY PRIOR TO CONSTITUTIONS
It is difficult to find in the history of taxation either in
this country or abroad the real beginnings of the idea that taxes
must be uniform. As was the case with many of our present
standards of governmental conduct, this criterion for taxation
seems to have grown out of a mixture of custom and historical
accident. There is a certain practical relation between its
development and the emergence of a property tax based on land
assessment and valuation, and yet, the idea is by no means
limited in scope or theory to that type of tax alone.4 Its rank
as a well-established constitutional provision came at a relatively
late date, and still, the feeling that people should bear the ex-
pense of government in some equal and predictable fashion is one
of long standing.
There is no particular precedent for the idea in our pre-
constitutional notions of taxation or in the systems which de-
veloped in England and the European countries during a com-
parable time. It seems certain that an obligation to pay taxes,
or their eqivalent, in return for the protection of the lord or
"In discussing the historical development of taxation, Seligman
offers one of the most plausible explanations of how uniformity
originated: "It takes a far greater sense of civic obligation to submit
cheerfully to direct property taxation than was necessary in primi-
tive times. Until within a few years ago it was deemed necessary
to base the theoretical justification of taxation on fanciful doctrines
of contract, or protection and the like. The method of taxing every-
one according to his property is the first rough attempt of a property
owning community to assess each according to his relative abil-
ity" And in tracing the growth of the general property tax the idea
is developed further: "The monarch, or public opinion as reflected
in the government, seeks to conform the practice of taxation to this
change in economic facts. The property tax continues but the assessor
tries to make the tax equitable by including not only the realty, but
also the new forms of personalty, whether corporeal or incorporeal.
The original land tax is supplemented by other taxes, or expanded
into a general property tax. The attempt is intelligible and even
laudable; for it is simply the manifestations of the ideas of univer-
sality and equality of taxation." SELIGmAN, EssAys iN TAXATION 4, 32
(10th ed. 1931).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
king was well established in the feudal origins of our law, and
even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there was the view
that each inhabitant should pay according to his ability or sub-
stance.5 There evolved in England fhe practice of measuring
this ability by listing the -value of a man's possessions, especially
land, and in time the possessions and land themselves came to be
taxed, but not necessarily uniformly or equally 0 The revolu-
tionary political and economic theories which- erupted in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed the belief that
taxes should be levied for public purposes and according to law,
and the colonial struggle in this country added the thought that
taxation and representation of the governed were dependent on
each other, but none of these historical tendencies was colored by
the refinement that taxes so imposed should be uniform. Equal-
ity was only a general objective of government.
As a matter of fact, there is little evidence that the concept
had a definite meaning or existence before it appeared in our
state constitutions in the early part of the nineteenth century
Justice Kent mentions uniformity as an inseparable part of
equality but does not relate either idea too directly to taxation.
7
Gray, considerably later, is careful to assert that equality is the
fundamental thought of government and that it is most highly
developed in the law of taxation, but in support he cites only the
numerous state constitutional provisions.8 Some of the statutory
provisions prior to that time reflected a uniform method of
assessing taxes, but this appears to have been more the result of
practical necessity in administration than in recognition of any
fundamental right in government or law. Any concern for
uniformity in the early legal history of this country went more
to the need for geographical equality between the various com-
munities of the particular colony or state, which were expected
to bear their proportion of the governmental expense. For in-
stance, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut in 1638, which
contained the first mention of taxation, authorized the general
court to agree on any sum of money to be levied on the several
For a brief explanation of these feudal exactions see 3 DOWELL,
HISTORY OF TAXATION AND TAXES IN ENGLAND 67 (2d ed. 1888)
6 CANNAN, HISTORY OF LOCAL RATES IN ENGLAND 22, 23 (2d ed.
1912)
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES 332 (14th ed. 1896)
'GRAY, LIMITATIONS ON TAXING POWER AND PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS
5 (1906).
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towns in the colony and further provided that- a comitittee e6dm-
posed of an -equal number of men from each such Thcal uiit
should be chosen to determine what proportion each town should
pay of -the levy 9 The Frame of Government of Pennsylvania,
drawn in 1682 and 1683, first made use of the new political
doctrine previously mentioned that "taxes are to be levied and
collected by general laws for public purposes only "10 Except
for these, the colonial charters and other documents of organic
law were brief and remarkably little space was given over to the
subject of taxation at all. The only uniform tax levied in the
early colonial period was a poll tax which soon became so op-
pressive and obnoxious that it fell into disuse.
The story of early colonial financial history, systems of
taxation used, and the evolution of the property tax toward the
end of the period has been adequately treated elsewherei but
for our purpose it seems safe to conclude that uniformity, as it
was later to be required in the constitutions, was not a part of
the picture. The idea of uniformity, insofar as it was inchoately
expressed in some of the earliest constitutional documents such as
Maryland's provisions of 1777, that "every person in the State
ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes according
to his actual worth in real property or personal property within
the State,'"'12 will be dealt with in discussing the constitutional
provisions themselves. Very little basis can be found for the
position often taken that uniformity is an inherent and un-
changeable feature of taxation supported by centuries of use and
practice as well as legal protection. Similarly, few definite
origins for the concept can be found in the historical literature
of political economy
The Greeks and Romans made no attempt to tax uniformly
in their systems of taxation although there is evidence of geo-
graphical uniformity in modes of taxation during the Empirei 3
and Justinian's Code contains language suggesting certain taxes
were levied in proportion to the acres of land or head of cattle
Campbell, History of Constitutional Provsmons Relating to Taxa-
tion, 1 PRoc. NAT. TAX Ass'N. 539 (1908).
"15 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CHARTERS AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3060 (1909).
' For a good condensed account of taxation in this period see
JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 21 et seq. (1931)
" 3 THORPE, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 1687.
'-SCOTT, THE Civm LAW 110 (1910).
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one possessed.14 The literature of the Middle Ages is noted for
its dearth of material pertaining to financial matters, but by the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries problems in economics were be-
ing thoroughly treated by Italian scholars without any indication
that any of the burdens of government, much less taxation, were
being borne equally, or that such an idea should prevail. 15 Early
economic doctrines of taxation were largely a development of
French writers, and while Bodin made a comprehensive classifi-
cation of taxes as early as 1579, no idea of uniformity was in-
cluded. The Physiocrats formulated the first scientific
theories of taxation, as well as classifications for taxes, based on
the belief that all taxes, including imposts, eventually fell on land
and could be most cheaply and easily collected directly from the
land. None of the Physiocrats, however, not even Turgot, said
that land should be taxed uniformly or equally
In the writings of political economists with whom colonial
students were most familiar, such as Adam Smith and his im-
mediate English predecessors as well as John Stuart Mill, who
followed, there is no demand for uniformity equivalent to the
brand called for in the constitutions of this country 16 The idea
never seems to have emerged at all in the English theory, al-
though Smith refers indirectly to the unequal valuations of the
land tax which he condemns as violative of his first maxim of
taxation to the effect "that the subjects of every state ought to
contribute to the support of the government as nearly as possible
in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy
under its protection. 'u 7 That this maxim in its most strict ap-
plication does not demand uniformity or equality is obvious.
In its truest sense the American doctrine of uniformity is
indigenous. If we are to find any concrete historical reasons for
it, we must look to the immediate background of the constitu-
tional provisions themselves for there were no outstanding legal
or economic explanations before that time. A brief survey of
how these provisions came into existence with mention of some
of the economic and financial conditions as well as political and
governmental pressures obtaining at the time may help to explain
why they were written.
" POSTE, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW BY GAIUS 140 (4th ed. 1904).
'Bullock, Direct and Indirect Taxes in Economic Literature, 13
POL. Sc. Q. 442, 444 (1896).
Id. at 455 et seq.
17 3 ADAM SMITH , THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 261 (1796).
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SECTION 2.
EARLY UNIFORMITY PROVISIONS
As has been previously stated, the early colonial period was
marked by surprisingly few provisions regarding taxation in the
fundamental law. The main problem of taxation had centered
for a long time in the struggle between the governments and the
popular assemblies, during which the representatives of the
people gained certain rights as to when and by whom they would
be taxed, but not too often as to how. The system of taxation
in vogue was a composite of the poll tax, the property tax, and
an ill-defined "faculty" tax based on the income earning
capacity of certain persons.iS The property tax frequently was
imposed only upon selected types of property, and the entire
system of raising money reflected the divergent business interests
and economic conditions prevailing throughout the colonies. No
consistent method had evolved of reaching wealth derived from
commerce in New England, from agriculture in the South and
from both in the M[iddle Coloies.
Some twenty-two constitutions were adopted between 1776
and 1796,1" and less than half of them contained any important
provisions relating to taxation. Those included were confined
almost entirely to the requirement that taxes should not be laid
or levied without the consent of the people or their representa-
tives in the legislature. It was a time when dependency on the
legislature, rather than a fear of it, was a prime attitude toward
government, and, as we shall see, when this feeling deteriorated,
lengthy and extensive restrictions on the power to tax began to
appear in the fundamental law. Vermont was the only state be-
sides Maryland, mentioned before,2 0 to express thoughts on how
the taxpayer should contribute during tins period, and the pro-
Vision in her constitution to the effect that "every member of
society was bound to contribute his proportion toward the ex-
pense of protection" was the exception rather than the rule.21
As the colonies passed into statehood during the last decade
of the eighteenth century, two things happened. First, land be-
'JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 11 at 26. For a definition of the
faculty tax as well as a discussion of its historical development m the
colonies see SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 368 (1911)
Campbell, op. cit. supra note 9 at 545.
See note 12 supra.
. 6 THORPE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 3470.
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came increasingly important as a method of measuring wealth
and as the productive foundation for the overall economy
While the economy was by no means exclusively agricultural,
the ownership of realty as well as all kinds of personalty emerged
as the best and most readily available means of deternnning how
much money could be raised by taxation. This trend toward
making a general tax on property the primary method for ob-
taining revenue was aided and abetted by the additional fact
that the Federal Constitution, just adopted, limited the national
government's effective taxing power to duties, imposts and
excises, and denied the states the power to levy customs.
2 2 It is
well understood now that the so-called apportionment provision
requiring direct taxes to be levied according to population was
not written intentionally to create different systems of taxation
as between the states and the federal government. It resulted
from a compromise on the slavery question plus an unfortunate
accident in choice of words,23 but its practical effect was to
leave the states the general tax on property as their most fertile
financial source.2 4 The second event was the great increase in
public expenditure which followed the Revolution and coincided
with the acquiring of statehood. The opemng days of the nine-
teenth century in this country saw a rapid expansion of business,
U. S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 9 and Art. III, sec. 3.
Morrow, History of the Apportionment and Direct Tax Clause
of the Constitution, 10 COL. L. REV. 379 (1910)
21'It is doubtful if this division of sources of revenue was as
premeditated as some writers would lead one to believe. See SPAHR,
THE SUPREME COURT ON THE INCIDENCE AND EFFECTS OF TAXATION 3
(1925) "Direct taxes were peculiarly appropriate for the use of the
states, (and) by requnwmg that direct taxes be apportioned according
to the same census that determined representation, the framers of the
Constitution provided more effectively than they realized against
the danger that the nation might tyranically appropriate property
in the wealthy states." See also: SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 671
(1931) for an even more accurate statement of historical fact:
"Under the new constitution the states abandoned to the federal gov-
ernment the power to levy import duties, and by implication, to levy
taxes of any kind on interstate commerce as well. Both state and
federal government were also prohibited from laying export duties.
The whole remaining field of taxation was open to the states and
the nation. When the new government went into effect the states
concentrated on direct taxes on wealth in the form of either the
general property tax or special classes of property as well as from
certain taxes on business and polls. Under the statesman like guidance
of Alexander Hamilton, the federal government decided to derive its
revenue not only from imports and duties, which were designed to
constitute the leading source of income, but also from a combination
of direct and indirect taxes lumped together under the heading of
internal revenue." Cf. JENSEN, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 35.
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land settlement, trade, and many other enterprises which-created
a need for more spending. The most obvious way to meet this
need in light of the newly assumed position as states in a federal
government which could not effectively levy a direct tax was
to expand the tax base so it would include practically all
property
The inequities which naturally resulted from these two
events seem to have led to the first expressions in the constitu-
tions that taxes should be uniform. Tennessee's constitution of
1796, contained the first real uniformity provision, and it related
explicitly to the question of how different land was to be taxed
equally The provision read "All lands liable to taxation shall
be taxed equal and uniform in such manner that no one hundred
acres shall be taxed higher than another except town lots which
shall not be taxed higher than 200 acres of land each." 25 While
the wording may indicate a primary concern for a type of geo-
graphical uniformity, it does show an additional interest in
achieving some kind of balance under a system of taxation broad
enough to include various kinds of land. In other words, as the
tax base of the states was expanded, inequality inherent in the
levying of the tax gave rise to the desire to achieve a semblance
of uniformity This tendency alone cannot account for the great
development in uniformity provisions in the forty years follow-
ing 1800, but it is a reasonable explanation of why the first ones
germinated.
SECTION 3.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFORMITY PROVISIONS
The trend initiated by the Tennessee provision continued in
the first twenty years after 1800, but its development was
sporadic, and it did not always result in uniformity provisions in
the strict sense. Of ine constitutions adopted during this period,
five made no mention of a uniformity provision and the other
four showed no agreement on language or purpose.26 Illinois
used some ingenuity in 1818 by providing that "the mode of
levying a tax shall be by valuation so that every person shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she has
in his or her possession. "27 Alabama and Maine showed some
6 THORPE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 3417.
' JENSON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 37.
-12 THORPE, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 983.
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influence of the Tennessee idea a year later with provisions re-
quiring that "all land liable to taxation in this state shall be
taxed in proportion to their value", a provision which Maine re-
vised later to include personalty 28 In Missouri in 1820, the
simple yet comprehensive requirement was established that "all
property subject to taxation be taxed in proportion to its
value. "29 It is not unusual that as the tax base was expanded
value of property should become the method for measuring con-
tribution, but why such a standard should be put in the con-
stitution is not so clear. The general wording and brevity of
the provisions indicates there was no desire to set up a complete
and detailed prerequisite for taxes, but a feeling that the legis-
lature should conform to some pattern of equality in levying
taxes was beginning to assert itself. The old fear that taxes
might be levied without the consent of the people was being sup-
planted gradually by a desire for equal valuation. The power to
tax was in the hands of the legislature, and the surest way of
restricting or controlling that power was by writing standards
into the constitution.
The next twenty years, from 1820 to 1840, saw no marked
change in the trend, although there was less constitutional modi-
fication with respect to taxation than in the following twenty
years. The constitutions of Virginia in 1830, Delaware in 1831,
Mississippi in 1832, Michigan in 1835, and Pennsylvania in 1838,
included no limitations on taxation.30 In the last named year
Florida accepted a broad provision to the effect that "the general
assembly shall devise and adopt a system of revenue having re-
gard to an equal and uniform mode of taxation, to be general
throughout the state", and Tennessee in her third constitution
made her position even more complicated by saying, "All lands
liable to taxation town lots, bank stock, slaves and such other
property as the legislature may deem expedient, shall be taxable.
All property shall be taxed according to its value and no one
species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be
taxed higher than any other species of property of equal
value. "31
21 1 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CHARTERS AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAws 109 (1909), 3 Id. at 1162.
24 Id. at 2164.
107 Id. at 3819; 4 id. at 1930; 1 id. at 832; 5 id. at 3104.
12 Id. at 675; 6 id. at 3432.
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Although this period did not see too many changes m the
constitutions it was a time of great expansion into the Mfississippi
Valley and beyond. A new-found democracy in this territory
was felt in succeeding years in all activities of government, par-
ticular in constitutional conventions. Land speculation, the be-
ginnings of industrial development in the East, the panic and
bank crisis of Jackson's administration, the rumblings of the
slavery problem in the territories all bear witness that this was a
period of intense growing pains for the country and its economic
system. The clashing of interests in taxation, as in many other
fields, which took place in these two decades brought forth a rash
of constitutional revision in the following years, and it was from
1840 on that uniformity as a constitutional limitation really
developed.
Between 1840 and 1860 twenty constitutional conventions
met in eighteen states, and the tendency to require uniformity
was stronger than ever.32 Eight states previously without the
uniformity rule adopted it, and five others wrote provisions with
certain elements of the rule present. In 1845, Louisiana pro-
vided that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout this
state", and that "all property on which taxes may be levied in
this state shall be taxed in proportion to its value." ' 33 Later in
the year Texas included these provisions m her first constitu-
tion.34  Califorma in 1849, Virginia in 1850, Oregon in 1851,
and Kansas in 1859, all adopted a uniformity rule.3 5  In 1851,
Ohio wrote her now famous provision requiring the passage of
laws taxing by a uniform rule "all real and personal property
according to its true value in money"',36 and in 1857, the first
constitution of Minnesota required that "all taxes to be raised
in this state shall be as nearly equal as may be and all property
on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation and
be equalized and uniform throughout the state.'' 37 Rhode
Island's constitution in 1842, provided that "the general as-
sembly shall from time to time provide for making new valua-
'JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 11 at 38.
'3 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CHARTERS AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS, at 1406 (1909)
" 6 Id. at 3562.
1 Id. at 404; 7 id. at 3840; 5 id. at 3000.
5 Id. at 2830.
4 Id. at 2011.
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tions of property for-the assessment of'taxes in such manner as
they may deem best", and Wisconsin in 1848, provided that
"the rule of taxation shall be--uniform and taxes shall be levied'
upon such property as the legislature- shall prescribe. ''
3
Michigan adopted her second constitution in 1850, and required
the legislature to provide "a uniform rule of taxation, except on
property paying specific taxes and taxes shall be levied on such
property as shall be prescribed by law."39
Part of this marked increase in uniformity provisions can
be attributed to the fact that some states followed the older
states in adopting constitutional provisions without any par-
ticular regard for their own needs and problems. For instance,
the Ohio provision Was taken over by a number of states in spite
of its obvious weaknesses. The real source of the development,
however, seems to have been the increased fear of the power of
the legislatures. Railroads, land development organizations,
corporations, and many other newly organized institutions pro-
duced by an economy no longer based exclusively on agriculture
had received preferential treatment at the hands of the legisla-
tures to aid them in the tasks of building the country required
by the times. Too, more and more of the wealth of the country
consisted of intangibles, and the first classified property taxes
were being attempted in the quest to reach this new wealth. Ani
of these conflicting pressures led to a distrust of the people's
representatives, both by the people and by special interests. A
basic tendency to be distrustful of government conditioned by a
long struggle for political and economic freedom was now turned
against the legislatures. One of the principal techniques used
was to fetter the taxing power with these limitations written into
the constitutions.
After the Civil War the continuing development of an
industrial economy and settlement of the West were matched by
further development in uniformity Between 1860 and 1880
activity in changing the fundamental law of the state govern-
ments was more vigorous than ever. While the specific changes
occurring in these years may be less significant than during the
preceding periods, they were no less pronounced and the causes
seemed to be the same. There was the. additional factor in this
period that the Southern States were attempting to bring order
6 Id. at 3228.
4 Id. at 1963.
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out of the upheavals caused by the war. In these twenty years at
least twenty-one states changed their constitutions, some as many
as three times. 40 Those states which had the uniformity rule
continued to readopt it and the newer states followed suit as they
were admitted to the Union. West Virginia, in 1864, included
in her first constitution two familiar provisions. One was
positive to the effect that "taxation shall be equal and uniform,"
and the other was negative in forbidding "taxation of one species
of property at a higher rate than that on another species of
equal value.' '41 The new state of Nevada fell in line in 1864,
and the second constitution of Nebraska in 1875, adopted the
Illinois rule verbatim. Illinois extended her provision to cover
corporations in 1870. South Carolina in 1868, Mississippi in
1868, New Jersey in 1875, North Carolina in 1876, and Georgia
in 1877, all adopted uniformity 42
What had begun as a trend was now the well-established
rule, and by the end of the period a reaction had set in. The
same problems of inequality inherent in applying a property tax
to all kinds of land, which had given rise to the early provisions,
now assumed further significance as the basis of wealth changed
and the property tax no longer produced the revenue necessary
to meet the expense of government. Some method was needed
which would permit reasonable uniformity and still allow the
states to reach effectively different kinds of property as well
as to enact new types of taxes. In 1873, Pennsylvania came up
with the first constitutional solution by adopting a provision
which read "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax."4 Uniformity was not abolished, but economic necessity
was strong enough to bring about a modification which limited
the rule to uniformity within a class.
The last twenty years of the century saw only slight changes
in the constitutions on the point in question. Of seven new
states adopting constitutions, six included uniformity provisions
and only one provided for classification. 44 Since 1900 the trend
404 Id. at 1963; JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 11 at 40.
417 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CHARTERS AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS, at 4028.
'24 Id. at 2418; 4 zd. at 2379; 2 d. at 1035; 6 id. at 3298; 4 d. at
2086; 5 td. at 2834; 2 d. at 854.
'35 Id. at 3141.
"JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 1] at 41.
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has been toward classification with considerable reliance on such
a method as one solution to the difficulties of the classical rule.
Progress has been made in this respect, but its development is
beyond the scope of our discussion here except as it indicates the
way uniformity, in spite of its obscure origins, finally emerged
as a well-established constitutional rule from which newer trends
could stem.
That a doctrine founded partially on a desire to remedy
inequalities in an expanding tax base, partially on a desire to
limit the power of recalcitrant legislatures, and partially on a
rather blind adoption by one state of another's constitutional
provisions, should emerge as one of the leading rules of taxation
is a strange commentary on the fiscal history of the states. Even
more unusual is how taxes have been labeled in order that the
courts might apply or not apply the uniformity limitation to the
taxing power. A brief recounting of the economic history of tax
classification is appropriate here with a fuller description of how
courts use the classification process reserved for later discussion.
SECTION 4.
HISTORICAL CLASSIFICATION Op TAxES
The habit of labeling a tax and placing it in a category along
side other taxes of the same nature dates from about the time of
the Physiocrats. 45 2ost of the well-known writers in political
economy since then have followed such a method in solving the
problem of direct and indirect taxation which is itself the classic
terminology of classification. The legal aspect of the proposition
arose in this country soon after the adoption of the Federal Con-
stitution due to the particular wording of the limitations on the
taxing power established therein,46 and the courts of the various
states have been faced with variations of a similar problem in the
sense that often they must decide if a tax is on property, or is an
excise, in order to determine the legal consequences flowing from
its enactment. In spite of the fact that such a practice has
existed for a relatively long time, no great amount of success has
been achieved m finding a permanent foundation for the classi-
fications advanced.
' Bullock, op. cit. supra note 15 at 447; SELIGMAN, THE INCOME
TAX 536 (1911), SPAHR, op. cit. supra note 24 at 97.
"See notes 23 and 24 supra.
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The Physiocrats, as mentioned before, developed the first
scientific basis for classifying taxes and borrowed the term-
inology of direct and indirect from others before them who had
used the expression haphazardly 47 True to their theory that all
taxes were paid ultimately out of the revenue of land, they held
that a tax on land was the only direct tax and that all other taxes
of necessity fell into the category of indirect. This idea was re-
placed gradually with a realization that the incidence of taxation
was a more appropriate basis for categorizing. 48 Locke referred
to "laying a tax directly where it will at last settle," and other
English writers used the terms direct and indirect, but it was
James Mill who eventually explained this theory of distinction as
resting on whether the taxpayer was the taxbearer or whether
the pavment of the tax was shifted to another.49 Adam Smith,
meanwhile, advanced his own basis of classification, grouping
taxes as those levied on rents, profits, and wages. He added
materially to the direct and indirect controversy by saying, "The
state, not knowing how to tax directly and proportionably the
revenue of its subjects endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing
their expense. "50 This expense or expenditure criterian eventu-
ally developed into the British notion of indirect taxes, i.e., that
they were primarily customs and excise duties. The theory of
classifving on the basis of shifting incidence led to including
taxes on rents, profits, and wages in one group, and putting com-
modities in the other, although the former could often be shifted
in much the same manner as the latter. John Stuart Mill recog-
nized this when he made his basis for classification turn on the
mind of the legislator. He said one group should be composed of
those taxes which the legislature intended should be borne by the
taxpayer and another group formed by those borne by someone
other than the taxpayer. 5i The intention of the legislature was
no easier to determine on this question than on any other so this
distinction was short-lived.
The French at one time attempted to make a distinction on
the basis of whether a tax involved the preparation of a tax roll
or list, but this theory went only to the admiistrative end of
Bullock, op. cit. supra note 24 at 444.
" SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 537 (1911).
4"Id. at 538.
Bullock, op. cit. supra note 15 at 457.
SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra note 48 at 539.
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the problem. Other classifications have been used at one time or
the other, for instance, categories resting on possession as against
consumption, income as against expenditure, compulsory pay-
ment as against voluntary, and so on. Professor Bullock has
pointed out in a thorough treatment of the problem that at least
ten distinct theories for classifying taxes as direct or indirect
have existed in economic literature alone, and these do not in-
clude all the economists who have attempted to classify 52
If the constitutional provisions requiring uniformity had
contained words clearly defining the type of taxes to which they
were to be applied, this question of labeling taxes would have re-
mained a problem of the science of economics more appropriately
solved in the academic classroom than the courts. Unfortunately,
this was not the case. The provisions not only were written
loosely as to the meaning of uniformity, but they included various
expressions to identify the type of taxes that must be levied
under a uniform rule. For instance, some say all taxes, some say
property taxes, one says specific taxes, and others are silent to
the extent that only the word "taxes" itself is used. 53 This has
left the courts faced with determining in many instances the
actual nature of the tax, which has led inevitably to the problem
of classifying taxes. It may be said without too much fear of
contradiction that the courts have had no more success in labeling
particular taxes than the economists have had, historically or
otherwise.
During our early legal history there was no real basis for
identifying taxes on property, or taxes on the products of land,
or taxes on a privilege, to name a few of the possibilities, in the
purely legal sense. About all the courts had to rely upon was
the doctrine which had grown up around the Supreme Court's
explanation of a direct tax. While this problem is more general
than the one faced by the state courts, its solution in the Hylton
Case afforded some guidance for labeling taxes. 54 A wealth of
historical material has been unearthed on this phase of our con-
stitutional history since the Pollock Cases of 1895, and it shows
that hardly any scientific legal classification of taxes existed at
" Bullock, op. cit. supra note 15 at 459.
'For a listing of uniformity provisions by states see Table I,
which appears as an appendix to this article.
"Hylton v United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796). This case is
the first in the group on which the Supreme Court based its theory
of a direct tax prior to the Pollock Cases. Actually, there is little in
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all in the colonial period.55 Alexander Hamilton, in arguing the
Hylton Case, admitted that he thought direct taxation meant
property and poll taxation exclusively, but he was far from con-
vinced as to the nature of a tax on carriages. 56 It was possible
as late as 1895 to convince the Supreme Court that a tax on in-
come from property was a tax on the property and therefore
direct.57 It is little wonder that the state courts have found
themselves in just as difficult a position both historically and at
the present time when attempting to classify taxes. The im-
portant point in our understanding of historical origins at this
point is to realize that the labeling technique was used in inter-
preting the uniformity provisions. How it worked out and how
the classifications made compare with those advanced historically
by economists will be enlarged on later.
SECTION 5
SUMMARY
It has been shown that historically the origins of the idea
of uniformity in taxation are obscure. At least there was no
early express requirement for it either in economic literature or
legal practice, although the related concept of equality in burden
undoubtedly preceded by some length of time the constitutional
limitations written in this country during the first half of the
nineteenth century These uniformity provisions in the state
constitutions had their immediate origins in an attempt to remove
inequalities resulting from adoption by the states of the general
property tax with its ever-expanding tax base and, in some in-
stances, in the mere acceptance of such provisions from other
states. They emerged by way of constitutional limitations rather
than by statute because their origin coincided with a general
movement to restrict the power of the legislatures at a time when
the country was undergoing great growth in land settlement and
it to suggest an elaborate system for classifying taxes, but since the
cases between the Hylton decision and the Pollock opinions coincided
in point of time with the interpretation of the uniformity provisions
by the state courts, they may have been influential on them. At least
the problem in both instances is one of restricting the taxing power
by invoking a constitutional limitation.
7 For a thorough historical analysis on the point see Morrow,
History of the Apportionment and Direct Tax Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 10 COL. L. REv. 379 (1910).
"Ibid.
'The Pollock Cases, 157 U. S. 429 (1894), 158 U. S. 601 (1895)
L. 3.-4
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in the initial change from an agricultural to a commercial and
industrial economy Finally, the technique of labeling and cate-
-gorizmg taxes on the basis of their nature, long practiced with
questionable success by econonsts, was used by the courts as one
means of construing the provisions where the language contained
in them was not clear as to the type of taxes to which they
applied.
PART II
UNIFORMITY AS DEFINED AND APPLIED BY COURTS
CHAPTER III
KINDS OF UNIFORMITY
SECTION I.
IN GENERAL
A Wisconsin court in analyzing a tax statute once said,
91 whether the legislative rule operates uniformly is not to be
determined by hypothetical mathematical results from the ap-
plication of the rule to various situations which human genius
may devise."Ss The same general comment is appropriate to the
task of determining what uniformity means when the constitu-
tional provisions are applied by the courts, for human gemus is
seldom more inventive than in devising tax legislation, and the
results reached by the courts are far from mathematical. Never-
theless, unless an understanding of the concept is to be purely
hypothetical, a consideration of its legal meaning is necessary
However uncertain and haphazard may have been the
historical origins of these constitutional limitations, they circum-
scribe the state's taxing power at its very foundation," and their
underlying purpose or objective, as most often described, is to
bring about an equality of burden in taxation.60 The thought
SIn re West, 207 Wis. 557, 242 N.W 165, 168 (1938).
People ex rel McDonnough v. Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany, 355 Ill. 605, 190 N.E. 82 (1934)
'City Railroad Company v. Beard, 293 Fed. 220 (1923), Town
of Woodstock v. The Retreat, 125 Conn. 52, 3 A. 2d 232 (1939),
People v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 273 Ill. 220, 112 N.E. 700
(1916), Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 170, 294 N.W 285 (1941), Walker
v. City of Richmond, 173 Ky. 26, 189 S.W 1122 (1916), Huron-
Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Board of Supervisors, 304 Mich.
328, 8 N.W 2d 84 (1943), State ex rel Haggert v. Nichols, 66 N.D. 355,
265 N.W 859 (1936), Young Women's Christian Association v. Ports-
mouth, 89 N.H. 40, 192 Atl. 617 (1928), Jersey City v. Martin, 126
N.J.L. 353, 19 A. 2d 40 (1940), State ex rel Hostetter v. Hunt, 132
Ohio St. 568, 9 N.E. 2d 676 (1937), Commonwealth v. Repplier Coal
Company, 348 Pa. 372, 35 A. 2d 319 (1944), Allen v. Bonded Mumci-
pal Corporation, 62 R.I. 153, 4 A. 2d 249 (1939), Texas and Pacific
Railroad Co. v City of El Paso, 126 Tex. 86, 85 S.W 2d 245 (1935),
Washington County National Bank v Washington County, 176 Va.
216, 10 S.E. 2d 515 (1941).
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may find expression in such brief statements as "public burdens
of taxation must be equally imposed upon every citizen", 6 or it
may be more comprehensively put as in Michigan where the court
said, "The phrase 'taxing by a uniform rule' means taxing by an
unvarying standard and requires uniformity in rate of taxation,
and in mode of assessment upon taxable valuation, and implies
equality in burden of taxation, and that such uniformity must
be co-extensive with the territory to which the tax applies. "02
It is not always clear whether the equality of burden sought
is an equality between individuals, 3 or between property, 4 or
between both ;05 and even equality of taxation is not always the
term used, for a court in Virginia has said, " the burdens of
government, as near as may be, must be ratably apportioned." 060
The demand for such an idea may be strong enough to lead the
courts to hold that "the constitutional provisions impose
upon the legislature the duty of passing laws which will secure
equality in burden of taxation",67 but normally the provisions
are conceived to be the basis for a constitutional standard or
limitation only Too, the need for equality is not always based
exclusively on a specific constitutional mandate. Sometimes it
is considered an inherent feature of the power to tax. The court
in an Illinois case takes such a position when it says, " in
the exercise of the power to tax, the purpose always is that a
common burden shall be sustained by common contribution, reg-
ulated by some fixed general rule, and apportioned by law ac-
cording to some uniform ratio of equality", 68 and Iowa, in the
absence of an explicit provision relating to taxation, has reached
'Walker v City of Richmond, 173 Ky 26, 189 S.W 1122 (1916).
'Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Board of Super-
visors, 304 Mich. 328, 8 N.W 2d 84 (1943)
'Allen v Bonded Municipal Corporation, 62 R.I. 101, 4 A. 2d
249 (1939), see also: Peoples Gaslight and Coke Company v. Stuck-
art, 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 729 (1918).
. San Bernadino County v. Way, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 117 P 2d 354
(1942).
1 Jersey City v. Martin, 126 N.J.L. 353, 19 A. 2d 354 (1941).
'Washington County National Bank v. Washington County, 176
Va. 216, 10 S.E. 2d 515, 518 (1941)
'State ex rel Hostetter v Hunt, 132 Ohio St. 568, 9 N.E. 2d 676,
680 (1937), Cf. Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corporation v. Thomas,
336 Pa. 572, 9 A. 2d 727 (1940).
'People v Illinois Central Railroad Co., 273 Ill. 220, 112 N.E.
700 (1916).
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a comparable conclusion under a provision that all laws of a
general nature shall have a uniform operation. 9 Emphatic as
the courts are in their recognition of equality of burden as a
paramount objective, they realize certain impossibilities are
bound to exist in achieving this end. One of the often cited urn-
fortuity cases, Wheeler v Whitenan,70 clearly states that "the
rule of uniformity has reference to uniformity of burden, not
necessarily uniformity of methods of imposing burdens and
realizing thereon", and it is frequently found that absolute
equality is impossible to attain.7 1
Although the courts are surprisingly consistent in holding
the broad purposes of constitutional uniformity to be the estab-
lishment of equality in burden, they make little or no mention of
the theory of burden. That is, whether there shall be an equality
of sacrifice or an equality of contribution in determining the
ability to pay Adam Smith's proposition that "the subjects of
every state ought to contribute towards the support of govern-
ment, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective
abilities, that is, in proportion to the revenue which they re-
spectively enjoy under the protection of the state ' '72 presupposes
possession of property as the primary source of revenue. This
doctrine is more or less reflected in the uniformity provisions be-
cause possession of property was the best criterion of wealth at
the time they were written. In more recent times attention has
shifted to other means of measuring wealth, and with the change
equality of burden may mean something entirely new. The point
is not raised here for final solution, but to indicate that the con-
sistent language of the courts is more deceptive than would ap-
pear on the surface.
Since some of the more recent cases clearly reiterate the
burden idea, it may be well to examine uniformity in some detail
before arriving at a final conclusion as to the purpose and ob-
jectives of the constitutional provisions. At least a functional
analysis of how these provisions have been construed, the taxes
'Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 170, 294 N.W 235 (1941).
1 96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977; see also Texas Pipe Line Company v.
Anderson, 100 S.W 2d 754 (Tex. App. 1939)
'City and County of Denver v Lewm, 106 Colo. 376, 105 P 2d
854 (1941), Allen v. Bonded Municipal Corporation, 62 R.I. 101, 4 A.
2d 249 (1939), Washington County National Bank v Washington
County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E. 2d 515 (1941)
113 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 368 (1828).
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to which they have been applied, and the related problems of
classification, assessment, et cetera, should throw more light on
whether their use has led to a successful accomplishment of the
purpose attributed to them by the courts.
It is believed the functional approach is best maintained by
considering first, various kinds of uniformity in terms of
phraseology, scope, and effect, and secondly, the results reached
on the constitutionality of certain types of taxes. The latter
problem is primarily one of labeling the nature of the tax and
determining the validity of classifications. In the interest of
accuracy it should be said that even these categories for the pur-
pose of discussion are illusory, for in the cases the distinctions
shade and blend into each other until it is impossible to think of
assessment according to value, a kind of uniformity, except in
terms of property, and uniformity within the class is an in-
separable part of excise taxation. Similarly, the constitution-
ality of a graduated income tax depends largely on the effect of
the constitutional provisions on the power to classify
SECTION 2
DEPENDING ON THE PHRASEOLOGY OF THE PROVISIONS
The variety of language used in the various constitutions
gives rise to the first, or most elementary, differences existing in
the meaning of the concept of uniformity 73 The courts have
followed closely the inexact wording of the constitutional pro-
visions in the process of finding a definition in their respective
jurisdictions, and have been little influenced by any apparent
tendency to set up standards divorced from the plain meaning of
the constitutions. While this difference in phraseology has not
led to any profound deviations from the general objectives of the
provisions discussed before, it has afforded an accessible method
for restricting or expanding the effect of the limitations on the
taxing power when the courts have felt that such a course of
action was called for on their part.
On the face of the constitutional provisions the major dif-
ferences in phraseology occur in the modifiers which describe the
system of taxation required, or how taxes must be levied. The
terms used include uniform, uniform rule, uniform rate, levied
" For a listing of constitutional provisions by states see Table I,
which appears as an appendix to this article.
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according to value, and assessed in proportion to value. If the
usage in each state was confined to any single one of the terms
enumerated, much of the confusion and litigation which has ac-
companied the interpretation would have been avoided, but such
is not the case. Many provisions combine the descriptive terms
used in a single clause, and also have different modifiers in dif-
ferent clauses. For instance, some of those provisions grouped
under the term uniform provide additionally for property taxes
to be levied according to value. Those using the uniform rate
phraseology provide for a uniform rate of assessment and taxa-
tion, or of assessment alone, and the according-to-value pro-
visions may describe either the act of levying or the act of as-
sessment, or both.
Insofar as phraseology is concerned, however, differences in
lunds of uniformity are relatively simple and few. Where the
wording centers in the general adjective "uniform", a general
kind of uniformity in the method of taxation usually is meant.
The same is true of the term uniform rule. If the word rate ap-
pears, the court most often will find that a general uniformity in
terms of rates of taxation is what is intended, unless there is a
specific reference to assessment or valuation.74 Although the
word uniform does not actually appear in the constitution, the
phrase levied according to value is construed to mean a um-
formity of valuation and assessment of property 7 Where the,
constitutional language leaves some ground for doubt most
jurisdictions will find that a standard of uniformity must be ap-
plied to both the rate of taxation and the manner of valuation.7 6
Usually, however, such a standard will not be extended to cover
the method or technique for arriving at a particular assessment.77
' Schelman v Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 151
Fla. 96, 9 So. 2d 197 (1943), Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 170, 294 N.W
235 (1941).
People's Gaslight and Coke Company v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 165,
121 N.E. 629 (1918), People ex rel Toman v Chicago Union Station
Company, 383 Im. 153, 48 N.E. 2d 524 (1943), Shivel v Vidro, 295
Mich. 10, 294 N.W 78 (1941)
' City Railroad Company v. Beard, 293 Fed. 448 (1923), Hays v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 159 Ark. 101, 250 S.W 879
(1923), Gottshein v. Gray, 25 Cal. 2d 26, 152 P 2d 442 (1945), State
ex rel Seegfried v. Carbon County, 108 Mont. 510, 92 P 2d 301
(1940), James v. Gulf Insurance Company, 179 S.W 2d 397 (Tex.
App. 1944).
'State v. Cedar Grove Refining Company, 178 La. 810, 152 So.
531 (1934), Hannett v. Kansas City, 173 S.W 2d 70 (Mo. 1944) But
see San Bernadino County v. Way, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 117 P 2d 354
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The generic expression "uniformity", then, in relation to
the descriptive phraseology found in the constitutions, can mean
either a general uniformity of taxation, or a more specific refer-
ence to an ad valorem basis for property taxation, both as to rate
or assessment. The two meanings are fundamentally distinct,
and it is essential to clear thinking that an effort be made in each
case to recognize which one is involved. Such a conclusion ob-
viously goes only to the substantive meaning of the word. A
geographical connotation is a part of the complete idea
symbolized in the term, and quite often the expression "within
the territorial limits of the taxing authority" occurs in the con-
stitutions, but geographical uniformity is not a primary basis
for limiting the taxing power, either of the states or the federal
government.78 Its purpose is to create what may be thought
of as an administrative rule for the uniform execution of such
tax legislation as the legislature may enact, and logically falls
outside the expressed concern of this discussion.
Just where the distinctions underlying the meaning of
uniformity cross the boundary line between phraseology and
function is problematical. The cases seem to confuse the issue
by sliding over the fact that the creation of lands of uniformity,
two of which have been traced to phraseology, also may be a
means of extending or restricting the limitations on the taxing
power. By so doing the importance of the extent or scope of
these provisions is ignored.
SECTION 3
DEPENDING ON THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS
An attempt to find something distinctive about uniformity
,on the basis of the scope of the constitutional provision may be
too empirical a technique in analysis, but it does help to under-
stand that the basic reqnirement does not apply to the same taxes
in all jurisdictions. To this extent the meaning of uniformity in
one state is different from the meaning in another state, and the
same is true under different clauses in the same constitution.
A full and complete understanding of the concept in its broadest
(1942) "The word taxation as used in the constitution embraces
both assessment and collection and both the levy of taxes and collec-
tion thereof must be uniform and equal."
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), State of Connecticut v.
Travelers Insurance Company, 73 Conn. 255, 47 AUt. 299 (1900).
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sense must account for this fact. The scope or extent of applica-
tion contemplated here is not concerned so much with whether a
parLicular tax is construed so as to come within the purview of
the constitutional restrictions as it is with the general types of
taxes which may be levied outside of, or beyond, a particular
constitutional provision. Tins difference in kind of uniformity,
based on the scope of the limitation, stems from the language
of the provisions which describes the types of taxes to which the
constitutional mandate applies.
The constitutions in some states require that all taxes shall
be uniform, but in most states the provisions are limited to
property taxes. 7  Michigan uses the adjective specific to make
a distinction, and some states have provisions excluding excise,
privilege, and occupation taxes from the rule applying to prop-
erty taxes. Those states which rely on a provision calling for
taxation according to value must interpret the scope of the re-
quirement, unless the adjective "property" actually occurs, or
can be inferred. Nearly all the cases indicate that the kind of
uniformity varies with the kind of taxation being considered.
The question of scope can arise in numerous ways. Where
the constitutional provision is not explicit, the court must de-
clare initially the boundaries of its application. A more fre-
quent situation is where the provisions on their face do not ap-
ply to non-property taxes. Here the problem normally is pre-
sented in determining whether any restrictions comparable to
those placed on property taxes are to be placed on excises,
privilege taxes, franchises, et cetera. Practically all jurisdic-
tions sustain the great majority of these types of taxes on the
ground that they are not property taxes and do not have to be
levied any more uniformly than would be required under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.8 0 Some,
however, cling to the idea that even excises must be governed by
some kind of uniformity
To state the proposition of scope directly, uniformity in
non-property taxation may be quite different from the kind ap-
For a listing of constitutional provisions by states see Table I,
winch appears as an appendix to this article.
' See for example: Waring v. Mayor and Alderman of the City
of Savannah, 60 Ga. 93 (1878), Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Mini. 254, 253
N.W 102 (1934), Knox v Gulf etc. Railroad Company, 138 Miss. 70,
104 So. 698 (1926).
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plied to property taxation where the legislature is permitted by
the constitution to classify in the case of excises, franchises, etc.
A counter-part of this position is that one basis of classification
is permitted for property taxes and another for excises. In
Illinois, for instance, such a question arose in the case of
Bachrach v Nelson,Si where a graduated income tax was con-
tested. If, as the court held, it was a property tax, the kind of
uniformity required for such taxation, i.e., according to value,
would not permit classification on any other basis. On the other
hand, the kind of uniformity required for excises, i.e., uniformity
within the class, while permitting of classification, might not be
as broad as an equal protection clause would allow.
Where such a delineation is not created by the language of
the constitution some states have created it by decision. Ken-
tucky, for example, has developed a distinctive basis for classifi-
cation in the case of excise taxes to meet a standard of uniformity
not expressly called for by the constitution. 2 Pennsylvania on
the other hand has failed to decide categorically whether her
typical provision that "all taxes shall be uniform on the same
class of subjects" includes both property taxes and excises.8 3
Nevertheless, a stricter rule of uniformity is applied in testing
property taxes than where non-property taxes are involved.8 4
The situation in Missouri also is interesting. There the courts in
the process of reconciling one provision that reads "taxes shall
be uniform upon the same class", with an earlier statement that
"all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to
value" have achieved a comproise. The former is held to gov-
ern excises and the latter property taxes so that classification is
permitted in excise taxation, but not extended to property taxes
in spite of the use of the general term "taxes" in the first,
provision.8 5
Most states fit in at least one of three ways into the scope
8'349 Ill. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932).
"Trnble, Excise Taxes and the Uniformity Clause of the Ken-
tucky Constitution, 25 Ky. L. J. 342 (1937), Matthews, Constitutional
Uniformity as a Rule for the Validity of License Taxes in Kentucky,
36 Ky. L.J. 357 (1948).
'Note, Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in Taxation,
87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219 (1937)
Id. at 225.
Gorden, Uniformity of Taxation in Missouri, 24 WASH. U. L. Q.
242, 245 (1939).
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pattern as presented above. If their constitution is explicit in
limiting the uniformity provisions to property taxes, they apply
a strict and general standard of uniformity in valuation, but are
free to enact excises subject only to the restrictions of the Four-
teenth Amendment.8 6 If there are two provisions, including one
to govern property taxation, they apply the appropriate kind of
uniformity to the appropriate kind of taxYt If their constitution
is ambiguous, they show an Inclination to distinguish between
a rule for property taxation and a rule for excises so that the
former is governed by a standard, in point of strictness, some-
where between absolute uniformity and equal protection.88 If
there is a trend in the cases as to kinds of uniformity, it is to turn
more and more to the type which follows closely the standards re-
quired by equal protection.
It is evident from the discussion that the kind of uniformity
applied in any case is, in a practical sense, a question of how
much freedom of classification is allowed in exercising the tax-
ing power. Whether the difference in uniformity is one of kind
or degree is not nearly so important as the effect a given type
has on the validity of distinctions established between classes in
a tax statute. This is a fundamental problem. Its solution is
the object of many modern tax reforms, and the institution of
new systems of taxation devised to take advantage of the new
sources of wealth mentioned so often before. In order to get at
this phase of a decision a court must consider the phraseology
of its constitution, and mark out the scope of the limitations on
the taxing power contained therein, but these are largely pre-
liminary to deciding the real issue-the effect of these limitations
on the taxing power of the legislature.
SECTION 4.
DEPENDING ON THE EFFECT OF THE PROVISIONS
Some of the more recent cases dealing with the power to tax
have taken a very liberal view of what that power permits in the
I Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 91 (1928), Re Watson, 17
S. D. 486, 97 N.W 463 (1903), State v. Sheppard, 79 Wash. 328, 150
Pac. 332 (1914)
"Re Martin, 62 Kan. 638, 64 Pac. 43 (1901), Strater Bros. To-
bacco Company v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 604, 78 S.W 871 (1904)
"State v. Montgomery, 228 Ala. 93, 151 So. 856 (1933), State v
Applegarth, 81 Md. 283, 31 Ati. 961 (1895), Commonwealth v. Hutz-
ler, 124 Va. 133, 97 S.E. 775 (1919)
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way of classification of property and subjects, and by so doing
furnish a focal point from which to consider the effect of the con-
stitutional limitations on this sovereign power of the state. In
New York, where there is no express provision requiring uni-
formity, it has been said that "the taxing power includes the
right of selection and such right is unrestrained provided per-
sons similarly situated are treated alike and the tax is imposed
equally "s9 Even in a state which does have the conventional
uniformity restriction the courts have found that a "state is
free to select subjects of taxation", 90 and as an Oklahoma court
put it in upholding a 1945 gift tax statute, "The state has the in-
herent power to classify its subjects of taxation for the purpose
of levying a property tax or an excise tax, which includes the
power to classify gifts as subjects of taxation.' '91 Strangely
enough, one decision in Florida goes so far as to base such power
directly on the uniformity provision by holding that "the con-
stitution in requiring a uniform and equal rate of taxation con-
templates rather than forbids property classification for lust
valuation. ' '92
These illustrative cases, together with the general movement
toward giving the legislatures broad discretion in classification,
open the way for departure from the traditional general property
tax which saddled the fiscal system of most states for so many
years. They also place in sharp relief one of the primary func-
tions of constitutional uniformity that of acting as a limitation
on the taxing power by restricting the power to classify
If the taxing power inherently includes the power to select
and classify, a concept of uniformity based on distributing the
burdens of taxation equally must of necessity be reconciled to a
full exercise of that power. The problem of uniformity becomes
essentially a problem in deciding whether all property, in-
dividuals, or subjects of taxation must be taxed exactly the same.
If such a question is answered in the negative, as it almost always
is, the problem then becomes one of determining how, and to what
extent, certain classes may be created, subject to a kind of uni-
'In re Howell's Estate, 255 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931).
" Singer Sewing Machine Company v. New Jersey Unemploy-
ment Commission, 130 N.J.L. 173, 31 A. 2d 818 (1943)
" Daube v. Oklahoma, 194 Okla. 432, 152 P 2d 690 (1945)
1
2 State ex rel Attorney General v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla.
641, 149 So. 409 (1933).
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formity which allows some classification. It has been said that
all tax legislation includes some classification, 93 and it could
equally as well be said that all classification includes an explicit
concern for constitutional uniformity As a practical matter, if
for no other reason, since provisions calling for uniformity are
the principal constitutional limitation on the power to tax, the
exercise of that power, as it manifests itself in the establishing of
classes, must be fettered or left unrestrained on the strength of
the classification made. It is improbable that a legislature will
attempt to extend its power to include types of taxes not provided
for in the fundamental law because it is sensitive to the constitu-
tional phraseology involved. Neither will it consciously limit the
geographical extent of its legislation. By elimination as well as
logic, therefore, the power to tax is most vulnerable where an at-
tempt is made to exercise legislative discretion m choosing be-
tween individuals and things to be taxed. Similarly, the weapon
most readily available for an attack is the constitutional re-
quiement for uniformity This logic is borne out in the cases
as will appear in subsequent discussion.
In order to measure the effect of uniformity on the power to
classify, some base or index concept is needed. Fortunately, one
is at hand in the basic idea and standards of equality which
exist under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and similar clauses in the state
constitutions. Even more fortunate is the fact that the courts
have made frequent reference to this concept in comparing the
effect of the uniformity provisions. In fact, the reference might
be called a trend. 4 It is not necessary here to make an elaborate
study of the restrictions imposed on a state's power to classify in
tax legislation by the Fourteenth Amendment, for such details
as are essential to the comparison will be revealed in analyzing
the constitutionality of various taxes.
A comparison between the effect of uniformity and equal
protection limitations indicates that the states may be divided
into different categories as follows Those states which deny the
legislature any power to classify, those states which have express
constitutional classes, those states which interpret uniformity to
t3 Birmingham v. Goldstein, 151 Ala. 473, 44 So. 113 (1907).
"State v. Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553, 273 Pac. 928 (1928), Ex Parte
Shaw, 53 Okla. 654, 157 Pac. 900 (1916), State ex rel Davis-Smith
Company v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911).
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be more restrictive than equal protection, those states where uni-
formity and equal protection are essentially the same, either
with or without a uniformity provision in the constitution.
For the states in the first group the problem is principally
whether property can be classified for the purpose of taxation at
all, because few states take the categorical position that excise,
privilege, occupation, and franchise taxes must be levied in such
a uniform manner as to deny the power to classify Generally,
cases in jurisdictions under this heading proceed on the theory
that the uniformity provision, especially if it is the ad valorem
type imposed on property taxes, was adopted specifically to pre-
vent the classification of property The Ohio courts, until the
comparatively recent adoption of a constitutional amendment,
contributed much of the historical support for this position,"
and Kansas, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Illinois still maintain
it.96 The court in the last named state in Bachrach v Nelsoz,
previously discussed, 97 showed at some length how the uniformity
provision was adopted historically to insure that all property
would be taxed according to value, and, after reviewing the de-
cisions over a number of years, expressly denied the power to
classify by saying, " by an unbroken chain of decisions this
court has consistently interpreted the plain and unambiguous
language of the constitution, by which all needful revenue shall
be raised 'by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, or
her or its property' as intended to cast the burdens of taxation
equally upon all property of every description in the state. '"
The second mentioned group is illustrated by California
whose constitution in Article XIII, section 2, provides that
( the legislature may classify any and all kinds of per-
sonal property for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a
manner and at a rate or rates in proportion to value different
from any other property n this state " Maryland, likewise,
makes a special classification for personal property and improve-
ments on land, and Florida, in Article IX, section 1, subjects m-
' Saviers v Smith, 101 Ohio St. 132, 128 N.W 269 (1920).
O'State v Cline, 91 Kan. 416, 137 Pac. 832 (1911), Bartel's Oil
Company v. Jackman, 29 N.D. 236, 150 N.W 576 (1915), Hill v.
Whitice, 149 Tenn. 168, 258 S.W 407 (1923)
349 Ill. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932), discussed at p. 58.
Id. at 584, 182 N.E. at 913.
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tangible property to special rates. As a matter of fact, the prob-
lem of uniformity in jurisdictions such as these has been only
partially solved in that the need for classification m some par-
ticular case has been given constitutional recognition.
The great majority of jurisdictions fall into the last two
categories, for there has been widespread recognition of the need
for classification since the turn of the century It is here, also,
that the ramifications in kinds of uniformity appear according
to the degree of restriction imposed on the power to classify
Once a state concedes that some classification is or should be
permitted, its courts are confronted with a number of questions
which must be answered before any general theme as to the na-
ture of uniformity can be evolved. 'May certain subjects be ex-
empted from taxation according to the quantity of the thing
taxed,' Ilay different kinds of property and other subjects be
taxed according to different rates'? May the rate vary according
to quantity' May valuation be made a basis of classification?
These are only a few of the questions that arise. The answers to
these questions, together with the criteria used to determine the
validity of non-property tax classification under uniform within
the class provisions, determine the category in which a particular
jurisdiction may find itself as regards uniformity versus equal
protection. The determination is made m light of the particular
provision involved, both as to type and scope.
The jurisdictions included in group three involve two
situations. The first arises when some degree of classification is
allowed under a provision requiring property to be taxed ac-
cording to value. The second is where a provision exists per-
mitting uniformity within a class, but the power to classify is
restricted to a greater extent than if the rules of equal protection
were applied. Classification under an "according to value"
provision is largely a question of assessment, because such a pro-
vision by its express wording assumes as far as theory is con-
cerned that all property will be taxed the same. The classifica-
tion resulting from this type of provision, if indeed it is proper
at all to speak of it as classification, arises from denial of relief
to the taxpayer when he makes one of three most prevalent com-
plaints where he contends that uniformity is lacking because m
determimng the assessed value of his property the full value was
not debased to the same level as other property m the taxing dis-
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trict, or where he claims that his property has been over-valued,
or where he contends that there is an actual discrimination be-
tween classes, that is, that some other class of property is as-
sessed at a lower level, or omitted entirely from the tax roll. The
proposition that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its
value is obviously violated in any one of these three situations,
and the reports are full of cases dealing with this aspect of uni-
formity In the eyes of the taxpayer this is one of the most vital
problems arising under the uniformity provisions. Since a more
detailed discussion of property tax classification appears later,
it is sufficient to the discussion here to point out that some juris-
dictions deny relief in the situations mentioned and thereby al-
low what amounts to administrative classification. The classifi-
cation so created usually rests on a distinction between real
property and personal property The express constitutional
classification characterizing the category of the two jurisdictions
mentioned above, reflected to some extent the distinction thus
created, and much of the incentive for constitutional revision
which brought about uniform within the class provisions can be
traced to the same source. In the sense that any breakdown m
the enforcement of uniformity provisions represents a lessening
of their effect, these cases illustrate a kind of uniformity some-
where between the classical concept and the standards of equal
protection.
Another middle ground of effect is represented by jurisdic-
tions which build up a particular, or peculiar, basis for classifica-
tion, on the theory that such is required by uniformity pro-
visions over and above the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as
classification of property is concerned, the question of degree of
classification allowed revolves around the purposes for which the
legislature may classify Some courts will permit classes to be
established for the purpose of deternnming the taxability of sub-
jects.9 9 Still others permit a varying rate of taxation with the
class, 100 and usually such a classification is valid if based on
kind of property 101 The marginal type of case is where dif-
'Drew v Tifft, 79 Minn. 175, 81 N.W 839 (1900), Ex Parte
Shaw, 53 Okla. 654, 157 Pac. 900 (1916).
'Standard Oil Company v. Brodies, 153 Ark. 114, 239 S.W 753
(1922), Altitude Oil Company v. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202 Pac. 180
(1921), Re Opnion of the Justices, 123 Me. 573, 121 Atl. 902 (1923).
"Galfill v Bracken, 185 Ind. 551, 145 N.E. 312 (1924), State v.
Lawrence, 108 Miss. 291, 66 So. 745 (1914), State v. Ingalls, 18 N.M.
211, 135 Pac. 1177 (1913).
TAxATION-UNIFORMIITY REQUIREMENTS
ferent kinds of property can be taxed at different rates, but the
rate of taxation is not allowed to vary with the quantity or value
of the thing taxed. This is the interpretation of uniformity
which has led to the finding of graduated income taxes uncon-
stitutional on the ground that income is property, and to so
graduate its ley is a contravention of the uniformity pro-
vision.1 " 2 It serves as one of the fairly distinct dividing lines for
the junrisdictional categories assumed in this discussion at the
outset. The tendency to allow classification, but to construe
uniformity within the class as more restrictive than equal pro-
tection, ordinarily is not extended to non-property taxes although
at least one jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, has some cases peculiar
in tis respect.
10 3
The states which compose group four represent the modern
trend both ii the kind of uniformity provisions adopted and in
the judicial interpretation given them. They reflect a rather
advanced understanding of the fact that broad powers of classifi-
cation are necessary if the legislature is to effectively reach
present day sources of wealth. Included in the group are those
states which do not have a uniformity provision as such. The
Connecticut case of State v Travelers' Insurance Company,
0 4
decided in 1900, charted the course for a state which does not
have a uniformity provision. There, the insurance company at-
tacked a tax levied on stock of non-resident shareholders on the
pround that it was far in excess of the rate on the same class of
stock held by resident shareholders, and therefore violated an
inherent uniformity in taxation. The court expressly denied the
contention and indicated its opinion of uniformity by saying .105
"Every line of objection raised by the defendant
must invoke for its final support the aphorism. 'Taxa-
tion shall be uniform and equal' is contained in the
Constitution and operates as a limitation on the power
of taxation which this court is bound to enforce.
Express provisions of that nature may be found ,n the
local constitutions of many states, and have proved a
source of practical difficulties for legislatures and
courts. They are not found in our own, which assumes
''Windham v. State, 16 Ala. App. 383, 77 So. 963 (1918), Re
Hoffert, 34 N.D. 271, 148 N.W 20 (1914)
" Note, Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity sn Taxation,
87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219, 220 et seq. (1937).
73 Conn. 255, 47 Atl. 299 (1900).
Id. at 257, 47 Atl. at 300.
L.J.-5
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that experience has taught that the power of taxation
cannot be cabined within a theory of uniformity and
equality."
Then the court pointed out with considerable vigor that no
standard comparable to the one urged here could be found under
equal protection clauses, either in its own state constitution or the
Federal Constitution.1o It indicated that the power to tax in
Connecticut was no more restricted than any other legislative
power since "The Fourteenth Amendment seeks to add the
security of national protection to the two guarantees common to
the State Constitutions, by winch life, liberty, and property are
free from invasion, except under authority of law consistent with
the Constitution, and by which any person or class of persons
within state juisdiction is secured against hostile discrimination
in providing equal protection under the law in the enjoyment of
rights belonging to all.' u 07 This is substantially the position
taken by other states having no uniformity provision.
Likewise it represents the result reached by those states
which give a liberal interpretation to provisions which require
taxes to be uniform within a class. The cases are full of state-
ments similar in language and intent to that of a Delaware court
when it says, "The constitutionality of an act under the equal
protection clause of the Federal Constitution, and under the
provision of the State Constitution requiring uniformity of
taxation on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax, is to be determined by the
reasonableness of the classification attempted.' '1Os This idea
that the legislature has as wide a discretion in classification
under uniformity provisions as it has under equal protection is
sufficiently settled to cause an occasional question as to whether
uniformity provisions serve any useful purpose at all.
SECTION 5.
SUMMARY
By way of recapitulation the interpretation given the uni-
formity provisions from the functional viewpoint includes van-
ous kinds of uniformity in terms of phraseology, scope, and
effect. A difference in constitutional language, especially in the
Co Ibvd.
'o Conard v State, 41 Del. 107, 16 A. 2d 121, 124 (1938)
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use of modifiers, has created a situation where uniformity in one
instance may refer to the general standard for taxation and in
another to the ad valorem rule applicable to property taxation.
Further, either kind may apply to all types of taxes or may be
limited in scope to include only property taxes as contrasted
with non-property taxation. If the latter circumstances obtain,
one kind of uniformity constitutes the rule in one state and an-
other kind in a different state. Such a difference may come
from express wording of the constitution or result from decision,
and both kinds may be applied in the same jurisdiction to re-
concile two or more uniformity clauses in the same constitution.
The principal effect of the uniformity provisions is to limit the
power to tax, especially that portion of the power which enables
the legislature to classify Recognition of this effect lends itself
to judicial thinking about uniformity in terms of various kinds
and measurable by comparison with the standards of equality ex-
pected under equal protection clauses.
By such an index the states may be grouped according to
the degree of classification -llowed into those which permit none,
those which create a specific constitutional class, those which per-
mit a freedom of classification hardly distinguishable from that
permitted under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. A particular jurisdiction will fall in one group or the
other depending on the kind of uniformity it applies to the type
of tax involved in light of the resulting effect on classification.
A given jurisdiction may even appear in more than one of the
categories assumed if it has more than one kind of uniformity
clause. In point of effect many of the cases reflect a tendency
to allow an increasing degree of classification of property under
the ad valorem provisions and to leave the legislatures a broad
discretion and considerable freedom in classification under the
uniform-within-the-class provisions, subject to a test of reason-
ableness quite comparable to equal protection. Finally, all the
distinctions made blend into each other in any given case so as to
become the general basis for the decision. Quite often a court
must attempt to isolate all of them in order to determine the con-
stitutionality of tax legislation and it is surprising that confusion
is no more rampant than it is.
(To Be Continued)

APPENDIX
TABLE I.
Constitutional Provisions by States
(Only that portion of the respective provisions pertaining to
uniformity is given.)
Alabama
Art. 11, Sec. 211.
All taxes levied on property in this state shall be as-
sessed in exact proportion to the value of such property,
but no tax shall be assessed upon debt for rent or hire
of real or personal property, while owned by the land-
lord or hirer during the current year of such rental or
hire, if such real or personal property be assessed at its
full value.
Arizona
Art. IX, Sec. 1.
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, sus-
pended, or contracted away All taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of property within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be
levied and collected for public purposes only.
Arkansas
Art. XVI, Sec. 5:
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed accord-
ing to its value, (a) that value to be ascertained in such
manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making
the same equal and uniform throughout the state. (b)
No one species of property from which a tax may be
collected shall be taxed higher than other species of
property of equal value, (c) provided the General As-
sembly shall have power from time to time to tax
hawkers, peddlers, (d) ferries, exhibitions, and privi-
leges, in such manner as may be deemed proper. Pro-
vided further, that the following property shall be ex-
empt from taxation.
California
Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
All property in the state except as otherwise in this
Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value,
to be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter
provided. The word "property" as used in the article
and section, is hereby declared to include moneys,
credits, bonds, stock, dues, franchises, and all other
matters and things, real, personal and mixed, capable of
private ownership;
Colorado
Art. X., Sec. 3:
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
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ing the tax, and shall be levied and collected under
general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property,
real and personal; Provided that the personal property
of every person being the head of a family to the value
of $200.00 shall be exempt from taxation.
Connecticut
Art. First, Sec. 1.
That all men, when they form a social compact, are
equal in rights; and that no man, or set of men, are
entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges
from the community (Other than what may be derived
from the above, there is no provision in this constitu-
tion which has any apparent bearing on uniformity or
equality of taxation.)
Delaware
Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and shall be levied and collected under
general laws, but the General Assembly may by general
laws exempt from taxation such property as in the
opinion of the General Assembly will best promote the
public welfare.
Florida
Art. IX, Sec. 1.
The legislature shall prov-.de for a uniform and equal
rate of taxation, except that it may provide for a special
rate or rates on intangible property, but such rate or
rates shall not exceed five mills on the dollar of th
assessed valuation of such intangible property, which
special rate or rates, or the collected taxes therefrom,
may be apportioned by the legislature and shallbe ex-
clusive of all other State, county, district, and mumcipal
taxes; and, shall prescribe, such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation of all property, both real and
personal, excepting such property as may be exempted
by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, re-
ligious, or charitable purposes.
Georgza
Art. VII, Sec. 2, Par. 1.
All taxes shall be levied and collected under general
laws and for public purposes only All taxation shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.
Classes of subjects for taxation of property shall consist
of tangible property, and one or more classes of intan-
gible personal property including money The General
Assembly shall have the power to classify property in-
cluding money for taxation, and to adopt different rates
and different methods for different classes of such
property
Idaho
Art. VII, Sec. 2:
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be
needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every
person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to
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the value of his, her, or its property, except as m this
article hereinafter otherwise provided.
Art. VII, Sec. 5:
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and shall be levied and collected under
general laws, which shall prescribe such regulation as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all prop-
erty, real and personal; provided that the legislature
may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to
time as shall seem necessary and just,
Illinots
Art. IX, Sec. i.
The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as
may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that
every person and corporation shall pay a tax in propor-
tion to the value of his, her, or its property-such value
to be ascertained by some person or persons to be
elected or appointed in such manner as the General
Assembly shall direct and not otherwise; but the Gen-
eral Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers,
[et cetera] by such manner, as it shall from time to
time direct by general law, uniform as to the class upon
which it operates.
Indiana
Art. 10, Sec. 1.
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and
shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of all property, both real and
personal, excepting such only for mumcipal, educa-
tional, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable pur-
poses, as may be specially exemlpted by law
Iowa
Art. I, Sec. 6:
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform oper-
ation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citi-
zen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens.
Kansas
Art. 11, Sec. 1. o
The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation, except that mineral
products, money, mortgages, notes, and other evidences
of debt may be classified and taxed uniformly as to
class as the legislature shall provide.
Kentucky
Sec. 171.
The General Assembly shall provide by law an annual
tax, which, with other resources, shall be sufficient to
defray the estimated expenses of the Commonwealth
for each fiscal year. Taxes shall be levied and collected
for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all
property of the same class subject to taxation within
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the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax;
and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws.
Sec. 174:
All property, whether owned by natural persons or cor-
porations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, un-
less exempted by this Constitution; and all corporate
property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by
individual property Nothing in this Constitution shall
be construed to prevent the General Assembly from pro-
viding for taxation based on income, licenses or
franchises.
Louisiana
Art. X, Sec. 1.
and all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class
of subjects throughout the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and col-
lected for public purposes only No property shall be
assessed for more than its actual cash value, ascertained
as directed by law, and all taxpayers shall have the
right of testing the correctness of their assessments
before the courts at the domicile of the assessing
authority.
Maine
Art. IX, Sec. 8:
All taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by
authority of this state, shall be apportioned and as-
sessed equally, according to the just value thereof; but
the legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon
intangible personal property at such rate as it deems
wise and equitable without regard to the rate applied
to other classes of property.
Maryland
Declaration of rights, Art. XV, Sec. 6:
That the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and
oppressive and ought to be prohibited; that paupers
ought not to be assessed for the support of the govern-
ment; that the General Assembly shall, by uniform
rules, provide for separate assessment of land and
classification and sub-classifications of improvements
on land and personal property, as it may deem proper;
and all taxes thereafter provided to be levied by the
State for the support of the general State Government,
and by the counties and by the City of Baltimore for
their respective purposes, shall be uniform as to land
within the taxing district, and uniform within the class
or sub-class of improvements on land and personal
property which the respective taxing powers may have
directed to be subjected to the tax levy; yet fines,
duties, or taxes may properly and justly be imposed,
or laid with a political view for the good government
and benefit of the community.
Massachusetts
Part 1, Chapt. 1, Sec. I, Art. X.
Each individual of the society has a right to be pro-
tected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and
property, according to standing laws. He is obliged con-
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sequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this
protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent
when necessary
Part 2, Chapt. 1, Sec. I, Art. IV-
and while the public charges of government, or any
part thereof, shall be assessed on polls and estates, m
the manner that has hitherto been practiced, in order
that such assessments may be made with equality,
there shall be a valuation of estates within the Common-
wealth, taken anew once m every ten years at least,
and as much oftener as the general court shall order.
(and) the (legislature) is authorized to levy propor-
tional assessments and taxes upon property within the
state.
Michigan
Art. X, Sec. 3:
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of
taxation, except on property paying specific taxes and
taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be pre-
scribed by law- Provided, That the legislature shall pro-
vide by law a uniform rule of taxation for such property
as shall be assessed by a state board of assessors, and
the rate of taxation on such property shall be the rate
which the state board of assessors shall ascertain and
determine is the average rate levied upon other property
upon which ad valorem taxes are assessed for state,
county, township, school and municipal purposes.
Art. X, Sec. 4:
the legislature may by law impose specific taxes,
which shall be uniform upon the classes upon which
they operate.
Minnesota
Art. IX, Sec. 1.
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, sus-
pended, or contracted away. Taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects, and shall be levied
and collected for public purposes.
Mississippi
Art. 4, Sec. 112:
Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the
State. Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value.
The legislature may, however, inpose a tax per capita
upon such domestic ammals as from their nature and
habits are destructive of other property. Property shall
be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by ur-
form rules, according to its true value.
Missouri
Art. X, Sec. 3:
Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes
only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and col-
lected by general laws.
Art. X, Sec. 4:
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in pro-
portion to its value: Provided, That all motor vehicles
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subject to taxation m this State shall be subject to li-
cense taxes, the rate for State and Municipal purposes
to be fixed by the General Assembly;
Montana
Art. XII, Sec. 1.
The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance
of the State shall be provided by the Legislative Assem-
bly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and
taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, ex-
cept that specifically provided for in this article. The
Legislative Assembly may also provide for a license
tax, both upon persons and upon corporations doing
business in the state.
Art. XII, Sec. la:
The Legislative Assembly may levy and collect taxes
upon incomes of persons, firms and corporations for
the purpose of replacing property taxes. These income
taxes may be graduated and progressive and shall be
distributed to the public schools and to the state gov-
ernment.
Nebraska
Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental
sub-divisions shall be raised by taxation in such man-
ner as the legislature may direct; but taxes shall be
levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately
upon all tangible property and franchises, and taxes
uniform as to class may be levied by valuation upon all
other property. Taxes, other than property taxes, may
be authorized by law.
New Hampshire
Part 2, Art. 6:
The public charges of government, or any part thereof,
may be raised by taxation upon polls, estates, and other
classes of property, including franchises and property
when passing by will or inheritance; and there shall be
a valuation of the estates within the state taken anew
once in every five years, at least, and as much oftener
as the general court shall order.
New Jersey
Art. I, Sec. VII, Par. 12 (Constitution of 1844, as amended)
Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws
and by uniform rules, according to its true value.
Nevada
Art. X, Sec. 1.
The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall pre-
scribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of all property, real, personal and posses-
sory, except mines and mining claims, when not pat-
ented, the proceeds alone of which shall be assessed
and taxed,
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New Mexico
Art. VIII, See. 1.
Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in propor-
tion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and
uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6:
Lands held in large tracts shall not be assessed for tax-
ation at any lower value per acre than lands of the
same character of quality and similarly situated, held
in smaller tracts. The plowing of land shall not be con-
sidered as adding value thereto for the purpose of tax-
ation.
New York
There is no general constitutional provision specifically
requiring equality of taxation in this state.
North Carolina
Art. V, Sec. 3:
The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and
equitable manner, and shall never be surrendered, sus-
pended or contracted away Taxes on property shall be
uniform as to each class of property taxed. Taxes shall
be levied only for public purposes, and every act levy-
ing a tax shall state the object to which it is to be ap-
plied. The General Assembly may also tax trades, pro-
fessions, franchises and incomes: Provided, the rate of
tax on incomes shall not in any case exceed ten percent,
and there shall be allowed the following exemptions to
be deducted from the amount of annual incomes,
North Dakota
Art. XI, Sec. 176, as amended by Art. 29:
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of prop-
erty, including franchises within the territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax. The legislature may by
law exempt any or all classes of personal property from
taxation and within the meaning of this section, fix-
tures, buildings, and improvements of every character,
whatsoever, upon land shall be deemed personal prop-
erty.
Ohio
Art. II, See. 26:
All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform
operation throughout the state;
Art. XII, Sec. 2, as amended in 1933:
Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by
uniform rule according to value.
Oregon
Art. I, Sec. 26:
No tax or duty shall be imposed without the consent of
the people or their representatives in legislative as-
sembly; and all taxation shall be uniform on the same
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax.
Art. IX, Sec. 1.
The legislative assembly shall, and the people through
the initiative may, provide by law uniform rules of
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assessment and taxation. All taxes shall be levied and
collected under general laws operating uniformly
throughout the state.
Oklahoma
Art. X, Sec. 5:
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, sus-
pended, or contracted away. Taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects.
Art. X, Sec. 8:
All property which may be taxed ad valorem shall be
assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at
the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale.
Art. X, Sec. 22:
Nothing in this constitution shall be held or construed
to prevent the classification of property for purposes of
taxation; and the valuation of different classes by dif-
ferent means or methods.
Pennsylvanza
Art. IX, Sec. 1.
All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of sub-
jects, within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and shall be levied and collected under gen-
eral laws;
Rhode Island
Art. IV, Sec. 15:
The general assembly shall, from time to time, provide
for making new valuations of property, for the assess-
ment of taxes, in such manner as they may deem best.
A new estimate of such property shall be taken before
the first direct state tax, after the adoption of this con-
stitution, shall be assessed.
South Carolina
Art. 1, Sec. 6:
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in pro-
portion to its value.
Art. 10, Sec. 1.
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and
shall prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for
taxation of all property, real, personal, and possessory,
except mines and mining claims, the products of which
alone shall be taxed; and also excepting such property
as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational,
literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes:
Provided however, that the General Assembly may
impose a capitation tax upon such domestic animals as
from their nature and habits are destructive of other
property; and provided further, That the General As-
bly may provide for a graduated tax on incomes and for
a graduated license on occupations and business.
South Dakota
Art. VI, Sec. 17"
No tax or duty shall be imposed without the consent of
the people or their representatives in the legislature,
and all taxation shall be equal and uniform.
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Art. XI, Sec. 2:
To the end that the burden of taxation may be equitable
upon all property, and in order that no property which
is made subject to taxation shall escape, the legislature
is empowered to divide all property including moneys
and credits as well as physical property into classes and
to determine what class or classes of property shall be
subject to taxation and what property, if any, shall
not be subject to taxation. Taxes shall be uniform on
all property of the same class and shall be levied and
collected for public purposes only. Taxes may be im-
posed upon any and all property including privileges,
franchises, and licenses to do business in the state. Gross
earnings and net incomes may be considered in taxing
any and all property, and the valuation of property for
taxation purposes shall never exceed the actual value
thereof. The legislature is empowered to impose taxps
upon incomes and occupations and taxes upon incomes
may be graduated and progressive and reasonable ex-
emptions may be provided.
Tennessee
Art. II, Sec. 28:
All property real, personal, or mixed, shall be taxed,
but the legislature may except All property shall be
taxed according to value, and that value to be ascer-
tained in such manner as the legislature shall direct,
so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the
state. No one species of property from which a tax may
be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other
species of property of the same value
Texas
Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
All property in this State, whether owned by natural
persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be
taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascer-
tained as may be provided by law. The Legislature may
impose a poll tax. It may also impose occupation taxes
(et cetera). It may also tax incomes of both natural
persons and corporations.
Utah
Art. XIII, Sec. 2:
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the
laws of the United States, or under this Constitution
shall be taxed in proportion to its value.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3:
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible
property in the state, according to its value in money
and shall prescfibe by law such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of such property,
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax m
proportion to the value of ins, her, or its tangible prop-
erty, provided the legislature may determine the man-
ner and extent of taxing livestock. Intangible property
may be exempted from taxation as property or it may
be taxed in such manner and to such extent as the legis-
lature may provide.
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Vermont
Chapt. I, Art. 9:
That every member of society hath a right to be pro-
tected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property
and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion
towards the expense of that protection, and yield his
personal service when necessary, or an equivalent
thereto.
Virginia
Art. XIII, Sec. 168:
All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be
taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or mumcipal shall
be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and
shall be levied and collected under general laws. The
General Assembly may define and classify taxable sub-
.ects, and except as to classes of property herein ex-
pressly segregated for either state or local taxation, the
General Assembly may segregate the several classes of
property so as to specify and determine upon what sub-
jects State taxes and upon what subjects local taxes
may be levied.
Washirngton
Art. VII, See. 1.
The power of taxation shall never be suspended, sur-
rendered or contracted away All taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of property within the territorial
limits levying the tax and shall be levied and collected
for public purposes only. The word "property" as used
herein shall mean and include everything, whether
tangible or intangible, subject to ownership. All real
estate shall constitute one class; Provided that the Legis-
lature may tax mines and mineral resources and land
devoted to reforestation by either a yield tax or an
ad valorem tax at such rate as it may fix, or by both.
West Virginza
Art. X, Sec. 1.
Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, tax-
ation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state,
and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed
in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed
by law. No one species of property from which a tax
may be collected shall be taxed higher than other
species of property of equal value.
Wisconsin
Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
The rule of Taxation shall be uniform, but the legisla-
ture may empower cities, villages, or towns to collect
and return taxes on real estate located therein by op-
tional methods. Taxes shall be levied upon such prop-
erty with such classifications as forests and minerals
including or separate or severed from the land, as the
legislature shall prescribe. Taxes may also be imposed
on incomes, privileges and occupations, which taxes may
be graduated and progressive, and reasonable exemp-
tions may be provided.
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Wyoming
Art. I, See. 28:
all taxation shall be equal and uniform.
Art. XV, Sec. 11.
All property, except as in this constitution otherwise
provided, shall be uniformly assessed for taxation, and
the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real
and personal.

